

GREGORY OF NYSSA'S AGAINST EUNOMIUS

The Development of the Doctrine of the Trinity

Background

- In 360 Eunomius wrote his *Liber Apologeticus*
- In 364-365 Basil of Caesarea wrote the three books of his *Against Eunomius*
- In 378 Eunomius responded to Basil with his *Apologia Apologiae* in two books. It survives only in quotations in Gregory's response.
- In 380-381, Gregory wrote his *Against Eunomius* in three books, the first two responding to Eunomius's book one and the last one responding to the second book.
- In 386 John Chrysostom wrote *De Incomprehensibilitate Dei* against Eunomius

AGAINST EUNOMIUS

The work is a reply to Eunomius's rebuttal of Basil's critique of his *Liber Apologeticus*, written as *Apologia Apologiae* in 378. Books 1 & 2 responds to the first part and Book 3 to the second part. Gregory's work is written in Constantinople in 380-381.

BOOK 1

- He begins by setting out the circumstances of why he needs to respond to Eunomius
- He then praises Eunomius's style but says that it has very little content. He cannot find much worthy things amid the nice language. (1.4)
- "Perhaps for those who do not possess truth it may be an advantage to varnish their falsehoods with an attractive style, and to rub into the grain of their argument a curious polish. When their error is taught in far-fetched language and decked out with all the affectations of style, they have a chance of being plausible and accepted by their hearers. But those whose only aim is simple truth, unadulterated by any misleading foil, find the light of a natural beauty emitted from their words." (1.4)
- What follows is a passionate history of the Arian development (1.6)

156-182 (TEXT IN MEREDITH)

Responds to Eunomius's assertion that there is the highest and most real being, a second being who is after the first, and a third being subordinate to the first in cause and the second in activity.

Gregory replies that E. substitutes philosophical notions for Scriptural names (156) while the Truth himself used personal names, not abstract ones (157); this means that these names must be better names for God.

- Eunomius avoids the language of Scripture and uses other words than Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (156/13)
 - For this reason, he substitutes human language for God's own choice of words and thus substitutes a human concept for the reference to God himself

Eunomius is innovating (158); his purpose is to deny the real relationship of nature that the names Father and Son show (159-163).

- Eunomius's words remove the name of God from its relational context (160/14)

By calling only the Father the most real, he suggests that the Son and Spirit are not real, that they receive their existence from the Father (164).

- When the “highest and most real” is attributed only to the Father, then the Son and Spirit are denied full reality (162/16)

To say that the Son and Spirit are below the Father denies what the Scripture says about their goodness, their infinity, and the unity of nature between Father and Son. (165-170).

- If the Son and Spirit are divine, then they must be equal to the Father (168-171)

Even the Arian temporal priority of the Father could be taken to mean of the same substance, whereas Eunomius adds to a temporal priority one of degree (171-176).

Eunomius wants to return to a Jewish monotheism and deny the divinity of Son and Spirit (177).

Eunomius’s error springs from a false idea of how the mind reaches God. Eunomius seems to treat the Scripture as a true account of God that gives to the mind the tools needed in order to understand him. The task of theology in his perspective, then, is to take the colorful, narrative, and metaphorical account of God in scripture and, with reason, to discover what of God is being communicated by the scripture. The mind must strip away anything having to do with the economy in order to discover what scripture says about God in himself, outside of his relationship to creation. The metaphorical language of Father, Son, and Spirit must be made more precise, with clear, philosophical concepts. This leads him to say, as Gregory quotes him, that God is best spoken of as the highest and most real being. The Son and Spirit are best spoken of as second and third beings after and coming from the first. Only the highest is reasonably God. Thus the source of being only is God, and the best and truest concept of God is unoriginated. In the concept unoriginated, the mind is able to commune with the simplicity of God, rising above the entanglement of meaning in creative connotations. Beginning from this insight in to the nature of God, all theological can receive rigor. It can be clearly seen, then, argued Eunomius, that the Son and Spirit cannot be God in a real sense and must be of a different essence than the Father.

- Numerical rank does not mean difference of being (16)
- The casting of a difference of being of Father Son and Spirit is against scripture (16)
- Simplicity and infiniteness cannot be lesser (19)
- He posits an intervening energy between Father and Son and Son and Spirit (20)
- “His most peculiar characteristic is that He is neither of those things which we contemplate in the Father and the Son respectively. He is simply, neither as ungenerate , nor as only-begotten: this it is that constitutes His chief peculiarity. Joined to the Father by His uncreatedness, He is disjoined from Him again by not being 'Father.' United to the Son by the bond of uncreatedness, and of deriving His existence from the Supreme, He is parted again from Him by the characteristic of not being the Only-begotten of the Father, and of having been manifested by means of the Son Himself.” (22)
- If the son and spirit participate in goodness and are not good in themselves, there is no point to our belief and practices (22)
- Eunomius holds that the difference in levels of creation shows a difference in divinity: one energy produces more noble things, lesser energies produce lesser things (24)
- The everlastingness of the Son secures the everlastingness of the Father (25)
- The god-ness of God shows that he is beyond time and space; there is nothing that can be known of him other than his infiniteness. Thus if the Son and Spirit are God, they share in this infinite ungraspability. There are no differences in uncreated reality because this is God. (26)

- To make the Son less than the Father is to question the nobility of creation

Gregory argues that this approach is fundamentally backwards. It is not our task to reach God with concepts. This would in a way encapsulate God in concepts, making the concepts themselves God. Worship would then be an idolization of concepts, worshipping a god rendered in the reality of human thought. The human mind would then act as above God, who then becomes capable of the mastery of human knowing.

BOOK 2

- The names of the Trinity point to the unknowable divine nature (2.3)
- Scripture is from God
- Heresy has arisen by substituting names and explanations for Scripture. These are not differences of nature but special attributes. (2)
- Human nature cannot be taught the essence of God (3)
- The defense of belief in the One True God, denying divinity to the Son and the Spirit, falls short of the Scriptural claim. The fullness of God in fact applies to the trinity as a whole.(4)
- "not passing from one essence to assume the guise of three persons" (5)
- "no divider of his glory": there is no partnership among the three, but unity. The glory is one (6)
- We cannot divide the essence of God (7)
- The Son is the glory of the Father. Generation is not an explanation. It means derived from and subsisting with. (9)
- The phrase "The Lord created me at the beginning of his works" refers to the humanity of the Son as the principle and source of all human nature and thus also the final end of all human nature.

84-96 (TEXT IN MEREDITH)

Faith is superior to knowledge because the mind rests in that which is beyond it.

Having faith like Abraham lifts one above the sensible to the intelligible and then above the intelligible to that which is beyond the intelligence. This was possible because he was drawn beyond the limits of human perfection. Perfection and true knowledge are linked here.

- Philosophy became for Moses a preparation for the encounter with God, but the actual encounter drew him far beyond where philosophy had brought him (89)
- Since God is beyond all nature, it is faith that brings the mind to God (91)
 - "It is not possible, writes Gregory of Nyssa, 'to draw near to God unless faith mediates and unites the soul that seeks God to that [divine nature] that is beyond our comprehension' (*Contra Eunomium* 2.91, Jaeger, 1:253)." – Wilken, "Grace and the Knowledge of God", 247 n 33. As Wilken states in the text, for the patristic tradition, knowledge of God presupposes God's condescension to human thinking. Thinking about God presupposes revelation and revelation in the sense of God's own presencing rather than any information about him.

To call any quality or name "the essence of God is to make it a god and worship one's own imagery" (*Cont Eunom*, 2.100, in *Golitzen*, 292).

God is unlimited, without end; this means that he is incomprehensible (see McGinn, 141)

God is unknowable and infinite (*Gotlizen* 292)

The names (even "God") are drawn from God's activities. (Cont. Eunom, 2.127 and De Beat 6-PG 44.1268B-1269A, Golitzen 295). The names of God are always given via Scripture (Golitzen 295).

The names do not reveal God's nature; they reveal "the variety of his operations and his splendor" (Cont Eunom 2.302-304, 2.102, Golitzen 296). The energies to which the names refer do not properly exist; thus the names, *pace* Eunomius, do not give us a referent to God himself (Golitzen 296).

Creation is God's "substantialized" will (Cont. Eunom, 2.548, Golitzen, 295) and thus makes possible that names drawn from creation can indicate God. (see also Lossky, 89, citing In Hexaemeron PG 44.69A)

"It is true that Gregory understands them [the names of God] as constructs, artifacts that we have made (or which have been made for us) and use to 'inscribe' certain impressions and marks...on the motions of our understanding' (CE 2.168) in order to give the latter a kind of direction. It is also true that these 'thought-symbols' must be subjected to rigorous examination (Dionysius will call it *aphaíresis*) and never simply worshipped as they stand. They alone cannot make God present to us (CE 2.577). Nevertheless, they carry a kind of presence, 'a certain brief residue [*leípsanon*] of the fragrance of divine sweetness [*theía euodía*]' (In Cant. 1), that they correspond somehow to an 'appropriate reality in God'." (Golitzen, 297)

Staniloae sees the relationship of the persons as the taking up of the I of each person into the I of the Father. Gregory of Nyssa, in CE 2, calls the Son "another 'self' of the Father. 'But he who sees the Son, sees the Father, the Father has begotten another Self of his own (*allon heauton*), not by going outside himself, but by revealing himself wholly in this other.'" (Staniloae, 89, citing CE 2, PG 45.493B, Jaeger 337).

Apophaticism "is above all a disposition of the spirit refusing to form concepts about God; this resolutely excludes all abstract and purely intellectual theology that wants to adapt the mysteries of God's wisdom to human thought. It is an existential attitude that engages the whole person: cataphatic theology that reveals to us the divine names drawn for the most part from the Scriptures is a series of steps which serve as a support to contemplation. This is not a rational knowledge that we formulate, concepts furnishing to our understanding a positive knowledge about the divine nature, but rather images or ideas suited to lead us, to model our faculties for contemplation of that which surpasses all understanding." (Lossky, 37-38, citing *Against Eunomius*, 12, PG 45.939-41)

BOOK 11

SECTION 1

The charge is that the Father alone is good, as the Son said. If this is so, then not only the Son, but all creation is deprived of the good.

SECTION 2

Jesus replied to the young rich man that only God is good in order to correct his misapprehension of the location of goodness. Here we have a more subtle and contextual biblical interpretation than that found in either Basil or the other Gregory. Although, he does say, problematically, that "the answer was delivered...by the humanity of Christ", suggesting that the humanity can speak apart from the divinity. But this is not the necessary interpretation. It can be taken to mean that it referred to the humanity of Christ. Because, he continues, such an answer shows the reverence due to God and the current state of humanity. So, in fact, Jesus refers to himself here as if he were any other teacher, not the particularly of his own person, because he saw the young man mistaking him for just another teacher.

To say that the Son is not God based on this one passage, Gregory says, is to overlook the many other passages that call him God.

In the case of Father and Son, "one" implies not solitude but union.

SECTION 3

Eunomius uses the statement about the good to claim that only the Father is the Existant. The image of goodness builds upon the Origenist unity by participation.

The Father is the ground of unity.

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUSIA AND HYPOSTASIS (BASIL'S LETTER 38)

Text on New Advent site (<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3202038.htm>), translated by Blomfield Jackson from *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, second series, vol. 8, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1895). Revisted for New Advent by Kevin Knight.

Hanson and others argue that the terminology of this letter better fits the work of Gregory than his brother Basil and thus attribute it to Gregory. Indeed, the argument in the letter is very close to the letter *To Ablabius*, which is indisputably Gregory's. (Hanson, 723)

1 Confusion in the use of ousia and hypostasis is hindering thought about God. This leads people to talk either of one hypostasis in God or three substances.

2 Words referring to general attributes are used in the singular for different entities. This general attributes become numerically distinct when they refer to limited beings. When referring to two different people, what they share is referred to generally while what distinguishes them is referred to individually.

3 Hypostasis refers to the individual and the particular. Ousia refers to what is general and shared. The hypostasis gives standing (stasis) to the general qualities. In regard to the divine, everything that refers to the mode of existence of the persons is shared by each of them. They are each incomprehensible, uncreated, and uncircumscribed.

4 Every good thing effected in creation is effected by they Spirit, but it is also the work of the Son and the Father. What distinguishes the Spirit from Father and Son is his origin. The Spirit "is known after the Son and together with the Son, and has substance from the Father". The Son is unique in his only-begottenness. The Father is unique in his unbegottenness. Each is known in their own particular characteristic. They are known distinctly but always together: "He who perceives the Father, and perceives him by himself, has at the same time mental perception of the Son; and he who receives the Son does not divide him from the Spirit, but, in consecution so far as order is concerned, in conjunction so far as nature is concerned, expresses the faith commingled in himself in the three together."

5 When the mind is able to conceive of this, we must recognize that the mind is not conceiving of God but only of the path to God. The words and concepts are symbols of God that lead the mind toward God. The refraction of light in the rainbow can also serve as an analogy that leads us to glimpse how God is one and three.

6-7 Hebrews 1:3 has been used to argue for the hypostatic existence of the Father alone, but it should rather be understood to be presenting the shared glory of Father and Son. The glory of the Father is the glory of the Son in such a way that the Son is not secondary to the Father but simultaneous with him. The Son cannot be named without at the same time conceiving of the Father.

8 The Son is the image of the Father in the sense that the Father is seen clearly in the Son: "Thus the hypostasis of the Son becomes as it were form and face of the knowledge of the Father, and the hypostasis of the Father is known in the form of the Son, while the proper quality which is contemplated therein remains for the plain distinction of the hypostases."

TO EUSTATHIUS ON THE HOLY TRINITY

Text on New Advent site (<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2904.htm>), translated by H. A. Wilson from *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, second series, vol. 5, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1893). Revised for New Advent by Kevin Knight.

Those who are against the truth of the faith accuse those who defend it of either preaching three gods or preaching Sabellianism. They cannot see how God is one goodness, one power, one Godhead and at the same time three persons, and they argue that there is no Scriptural basis for this.

The charge of tritheism is not founded because the alternative is to subordinate the three in substance and call only the Father God. They are disturbed by referring to the names of God in the singular rather than in the plural, but this reflects the unity of the Godhead.

His opponents argue that the Father is God, the Son is the image of God and thus can be called divine, and the Spirit is the power of God.

The Scriptures and logic do not permit that the Spirit be conceived in any way less than the Father and Son. He must therefore share in everything that they are. If the Father and Son are encountered in the Spirit, then the Spirit must be given all of the names that are given to them.

We know the divine nature only by his operations and these operations are common to Father, Son, and Spirit. The unity of operations show a unity of nature.

TO ABLABIUS: CONCERNING WE SHOULD THINK OF SAYING THAT THERE ARE NOT THREE GODS

Text in William Rusch, *The Trinitarian Controversy* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980).

Written about 390.

The issue is, as Ablabius points out to Gregory, that ordinarily when we refer to three hypostases of one nature (like Peter, James, and John), what we mean is three separate existences of the one nature. Thus, since in the example we must refer to three men, not one man, if we refer to Father, Son, and Spirit as three hypostases of the one divinity, then we should say they are three gods. This, however, is contrary to Christian dogma.

The point of departure must be faith, and faith requires that we say one God.

The assertion of the oneness of God in faith cannot be merely a forced statement, though, simply overlooking numerical plurality. We must go beyond that.

One way to approach is to look at the nature of names. Names do not refer to nature. Nature in a real sense is one, such that the nature of John is not different from the nature of Peter. The distinctive features are what distinguish the hypostases and are summed up in the name.

The individual hypostases do not divide the one human nature, nor does the multiplication of the human race increase or decrease the one human nature. Human nature is truly one, but the experience of persons leads to speaking of it in the plural.

In regard to God, the oneness of the nature is beyond the oneness of created natures. The nature of God is beyond naming. The word "deity" does not express the reality of God in his essence. What is communicated by this word, and by each name of God, is some characteristic of God by which the mind can be directed to God. Thus, "we find in each of the names a peculiar reflection suitable to be thought and said about the divine nature, but not signifying what that nature is according to its substance." The names either exclude wrong understanding or showing how the mind should approach God; they do not communicate God's essence.

All of the names refer to these activities of God and thus refer completely to each of the three persons.

This might suggest that the three persons are one only in their activity, which would mean that they are three gods.

If the three were three gods, then there would be shared activity and individual activity. However, there is only shared activity. All names, other than Father, Son, and Spirit, refer to the one activity of God ad extra and are the common activity of the Trinity (44; commented on by Golitzen, 298-9): "every activity which pervades from God to creation and is named according to our manifold designs starts off from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed by the Holy Spirit."

The common activity shows the unity in nature. Nothing that God does in creation is divided into three, but every activity is the three-fold action of the one God.

God is infinite and thus above every name. A nature that is not circumscribed is one; the infinite divine nature must even more so be one. There is no difference in nature between Father, Son, and Spirit; therefore, they are one.

The three are one nature, but they are truly three. The difference comes from their cause. As Gregory writes, "there is the one which depends on the first, and there is that one which is through that which depends on the first". The Son is from the Father. The Spirit is from the Father through the Son. These are not names of nature but refer to a difference in manner of being.

Barnes ("Divine Unity") highlights the distinction via causality that Gregory uses to distinguish between Father and Son: "while we confess the invariable character of the nature [Barnes points out that this phrase signifies the unity, and is later replaced in similar discourses in other writers by "homousious" 54n43], we do not deny the difference in respect of cause, and that which is caused, *by which alone we apprehend that one is distinguished from another*; by our belief, that is, that one is the Cause, and another is of the Cause.... since the idea of cause differentiates the Persons of the Holy Trinity, declaring that one exists without a Cause, and another is of the Cause.'" Hypostasis, he comments, then signifies difference in existence, while maintaining the unity of essence (54).

AD GRAECOS

AGAINST THE MACEDONIANS

Dated to just after the Council of Constantinople in 381

1-5 There is no more or less in the divine nature

6-10 The Holy Spirit has everything there is to be divine; he proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son

11-14 The Holy Spirit is present in all divine activity, both in the theology and in the economy. "All activity begins from the Father, comes through the Son, and is perfected in the Holy Spirit" (100.9-11; in Meredith, 38)

19-26 (TEXT IN MEREDITH)

19 Baptism gives life in the place of death; only God can do that; therefore, the Holy Spirit must be God. But faith in the Father, mediated by the Son is also necessary.

The Spirit brings us the life of the Father and the Son in baptism.

20 Those who deny the Spirit deny the Father and the Son as well for the three are always united. The action of the three is one; what is done in the Spirit is the action of the Father and the Son as well.

The Spirit is the path through the Son to the Father; contempt also travels up this path.

The praise of the Spirit is the praise of God, which must encompass both our words and our entire life: "Once we have reached the height of human powers, as far, that is, as the human mind can go in

height and greatness of thoughts, even then you must suppose that even that is well below the fitting honor." (Meredith, 41)

21 Those who dishonor the Spirit in doing so do not know themselves for they rank themselves above the Spirit.

22 The Spirit is everything the Father and Son are. He is present throughout creation while remaining above it. He is glory itself and so can give glory to creatures.

The Spirit gives glory to Father and Son. The Son gives glory to the Father and the Spirit. The Father gives glory to the Son and the Spirit.

23 Withholding prayer from the Holy Spirit is the refusal to ask for grace from the one who gives grace. The argument that the Father and Son are one God and prayer to one is prayer to both is not extended to the Spirit. This denies the reality of the Spirit.

To worship God alone includes the supplication to, reverence before, and humble calling on the Spirit, in whom we worship the Father.

REFUTATION OF THE CONFESSION OF EUNOMIUS

AGAINST EUNOMIUS BOOK 3

There is no similarity between created and uncreated (Cont. Eunom, 3.6.66, in Golitzen, 291-2)

PERICHORASIS IN GREGORY'S THOUGHT

See Daniel F. Stramara, Jr., "Gregory of Nyssa's Terminology for Trinitarian Perichoresis," *Vigiliae Christianae* 52 (1998): 257-263

- Perichoresis was first used in theology by Gregory of Nazianzus when speaking of the humanity and divinity of Jesus. It was first applied to the Trinity by Pseudo-Cyril between 657 and 681. It was later picked up by John of Damascus.
- Gregory uses *perifero* and *anakyklesis*; properly speaking he speaks of interpenetration. It may be that perichoresis was too material
- The persons are "mutually inclusive" (Stramara, 258; CE 3.5/7.3)
 - If the Son dwells in the Father, then the Son is never non-existing (CE 3.7/9.3)
 - This also explains the oneness of God
 - The indwelling is depicted in terms of participation (CE 1.39)
- This principle is extended to the Spirit in Gregory's debates with the Macedonians
- There is a sense of revolving around one another
- They are completely immersed in one another.

AGAINST APOLLINARIUS

Gregory wrote two treatises against Apollinarius, one addressed to Theophilus, patriarch of Alexandria sometime after 385 and a longer one, *A Refutation, Against the Writings of Apollinarius*.

16-22 (TEXT IN MEREDITH)

16 For our salvation, the Son takes on the whole human. He is not human before the incarnation, nor does he take only part of human nature.

The Son truly speaks in a truly human voice so that we can hear and understand him.

17 The Son remains united to both the body and the soul in death and thus undoes what death had done.

- 18 The flesh (humanity) and divinity are two different things in the one Jesus.
- 19 What is consubstantial with the Father is not the flesh nor the human spirit but the divinity of the Son.
- 20 The self-emptying of Philippians refers to the taking of humanity by the Son and his self-confining to the limited scope of human existence.
- 21 The incarnation is a union with the whole of humanity. The Son is thus truly human and what the Son suffers affects all humanity. What becomes highly exalted is the human nature joined to the Son. Jesus is the name of his humanity, but because of the union Jesus becomes the name of the Son.

GENERAL THEMES

God cannot be known by creaturely minds. There is no time or measurement in God (see Hanson, 720, referring to Daniélou, *L'être et le temps*). The ascent to God with the mind proceeds first via creatures; Scripture purifies the mind to know God in this way. To know the real truth of things, though, the mind must journey beyond itself to reach God only in faith (see Hanson, 721).

Barnes ("Divine Unity") argues that Gregory does not have a notion of person as thinking/feeling entity in regard to the hypostases of the Trinity. Thus, the distinction between Father and Son is not founded on their relationship as such but on the fact that the Son is caused by the Father (see 53-54).

Laird (*Rethinking Gregory of Nyssa*) emphasizes the apophatic darkness to which desire is pulled (eg. 85), but the emphasis on the apophatic, however appropriate, seems to put unknowing too strongly, even to the point of transcending desire.

FILIOQUE

Gregory of Nyssa admits some role of the Son in the coming forth of the Spirit (43). Siecienski shows that Gregory places the Son between the Father and the Spirit both in the economy, like Basil, as well as in the Godhead (43). The Spirit comes forth through the Son (44). As Siecienski says, "It is thus doubtful that Gregory of Nyssa would have accepted the *filioque* as it was later understood in the West, although he witnesses to the important truth (often ignored in the East) that there is an eternal, and not simply economic, relationship of the Spirit to the Son." (44-45)

ENERGIES

Renczes, while acknowledging that the Cappadocians stress the distinction between God in himself and God's activity (108), claims that for them *energia* is something that arises from human knowing. The energies do not subsist in God, he says (115). He continues "A travers l'énergie, l'homme peut reconnaître un mouvement qui remonte de l'homme vers Dieu, ce meme mouvement que Dieu lui-même a effectué, mais en sens inverse, en allant vers l'homme sans que pour autant ce mouvement correspond à un statut ontologique proper en Dieu". If this is something that originates in God and if these energies are the place of the creature's encounter with God, then some sort of ontological status is implied. He refers to B. Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ selon Grégoire de Nysse* (Namur, 1994), 140-142 and von Ivanka, 418-21.

Balás asserts that Gregory's assertion that we cannot know God, but only the attributes "considered around it" or his talk of God's operations "descending to us" is not Palamas's distinction between essence and energies, saying "the repeated insistence of Gregory on the simplicity of God would not allow this" (128). He cites, in Gregory: CE 1 207-208: I, p. 87, 13-17: 45, 313B-C.

He also refers to R. Leys, *L'image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse: Esquisse d'une doctrine*, Museum Lessianum, Section théologique, 49, Paris, 1941, 101 n 5; F. Diekamp, *Die Gotteslehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa I* (Münster, 1896), 190-194, 210-216; K. Unterstein, *Die*

natürliche Gotteserkenntnis nach der kappadozischen Kirchenvätern Basilius, Gregor von Nazianz und Gregor von Nyssa: Programm des kath. Hum. Gymnasiums Straubing für das Schuljahr 1901-2, 1-44, 1902-3, 74-76; S. Gonzalez, La Fórmula mia ousia treis hypostaseis en san Gregorio de Nisa, Analecta Gregoriana, 21, Roma 1939, 83-85.

The names of God point to his activities, which are not substantial in and of themselves but are different aspects of God's powers, which have being only in the persons of the Trinity (Golitzen, 294, referring to Con. Eunom. 1.420, 2.359, 2.478-9, 2.353-4 3.6.17; De hom. Opf.). If we make them substantial, we create idols (Lossky, 31).

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